Samdhana Evaluation

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INTRODUCTION

Through its 2013-2016 Indonesia strategy, the Climate and Land Use Alliance (CLUA) seeks to create space within national and subnational policy frameworks in Indonesia for expanding community rights and participation in articulating low-carbon development approaches. CLUA seeks to address the contradictions in the political economy of forest use in Indonesia best exemplified by two competing goal statements. One the one hand, President Yudhoyono has empowered teams working across different economic sectors and ministries to achieve a 41% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions away from a 2020 'business as usual' scenario.[i] On the other hand, the long-established, vertically-oriented line ministries that predate (and will persist beyond) President Yudhoyono's tenure seek to implement a *Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesian Economic Growth* (in Bahasa Indonesia, MP3EI) that would lock in high-emission pathways of export-oriented commodity production, based on perceptions of regional comparative advantage.

A recent constitutional court decision, coupled with the Yudhoyono team's push for greater trans-parency and alignment of spatial information regarding the use of forest lands, has created significant momentum at the national level in Indonesia, as well as within key provinces, for improved transparency of licensing procedures for land-intensive enterprises, for recognition of community rights, and for more constructive government/private sector/civil society collaboration around the political economy of forest land use. Momentum will translate into positive and irreversible change only if the political spaces thus created are filled from below—forcing changes in governance, and changes in the attitudes of government toward the capacities of forest-dependent communities. In its grantmaking in Indonesia, CLUA has increasingly sought out opportunities to demonstrate those capacities to government—through REDD+ policy awareness and engagement, community organizing, and the marshalling of spatial data (mapping). A key CLUA partner in this 'bottom-up' effort has been the Samdhana Institute.

The Samdhana Institute, a nonprofit (501c3 equivalent) organization registered in both the Philippines and Indonesia, has received from CLUA four grants totaling over $1.5 million during the last five years. In 2009, Samdhana established a 'small grants' fund to assist communities in Indonesia with REDD+ preparedness. Since then, over 60 small grants with CLUA support have been made by Samdhana to partners in every corner of the archipelago (concentrated in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Papua), and 150 overall *via* other funds used for congruent purposes from the government of Norway and others. The program has shifted away from an exclusive focus on REDD+ readiness, toward broader engagements on land use struggles, mirroring CLUA's strategic evolution, as CLUA deepened its understanding of the political economy of forest use in Indonesia.

In December 2013, CLUA engaged an outside evaluator (Peter Riggs) to examine the efficacy of the small grants approach undertaken by Samdhana. 2 days of prep, 16 days of fieldwork+writing, and 2 days of first-draft writing were undertaken by Riggs in February-early March 2014, and this report and its accompanying Appendices form the main written output from the evaluation.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: This evaluation covers five years of collaboration between Samdhana Institute and the Climate and Land Use on Samdhana's administration of a small grants program that involved substantial regranting of CLUA funds. CLUA's support for a Samdhana-administered 'small grants program' went far beyond merely the funding of a low-overhead re-granting effort. Samdhana Institute successfully implemented the small grants program as a 'total support package' that included modest pots of money for field projects, but also support for mentoring, training, and technical assistance to NGO and local government partners; networking support and dissemination of information between grantee partners; as well as monitoring and strategic evaluation of these small grants.

Samdhana's strategy of working with JKPP and AMAN is a very good investment and provides the best hope for successful 'bottom-up' use of new pathways created in 2013 toward recognizing land rights. The small grants program's highest leverage is in Papua and West Papua provinces, where a strategy of working ~50% with civil society groups, and ~50% local government plus universities, has provided tremendous opportunities for synergy with the provincial low-carbon development plan.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

- **The current level of small-grant support is institutionally sustainable and highly necessary for the field.** Appendix C of this report is used to explore justifications for higher per-year levels of re-granting. **Allow Samdhana continued flexibility to implement its 'total support package' approach.**

- **The MK 35 Constitutional Court decision clarified the need for collaboration between field NGOs and national NGOs, and between the indigenous and environment movements.** Responding to the impacts of this crucial political development should be at the heart of CLUA's Indonesia strategy moving forward.

- **CLUA small grants support for work in Papua should be continued.**

- **Samdhana and CLUA should have a strong strategic sense of when and where to apply larger-scale mapping efforts.** Three dimensions of this include: a) where capacity building and leadership opportunities will make the biggest difference; b) where Bupatis are sympathetic and will support the process; and c) where the SLPP mapping team has consolidated into a force that JKPP (and others) can build upon.

- **Samdhana could do more to link to other CLUA strategic media partners in Indonesia, namely InterMatrix and Mongabay-Indonesia.** Samdhana might also pursue the idea of recruiting Fellows specializing in media and communications.

- **Samdhana and CLUA could convene a learning process** with three sectors of civil society – *adat*, agrarian, and environment+conservation – leading to a coherent alternative vision to the MP3EI, that can be presented to the government and to media.

PROPOSAL RECOMMENDATIONS

- **The focus on 'graduation' was somewhat misplaced and should be retired. However, an evaluation system needs to replace it. Future proposals should show greater concern for the 'step-wise' nature of grant expectations. Samdhana should develop a matrix for expressing skills transfer + civil society development goals in relation to regranting strategy.** Samdhana might be asked to create 'tiers' for achievement, showing what tasks would be implied at different tiers. This anticipates the problem of organizations that may make for a very appropriate and strategic small grant partner but turn out to be problematic if asked to manage a broader program on its own.

- **Maintain line-item budget support for regional planning meetings, and tactical meeting money enabling fast responses to the rapidly changing set of new tenure opportunities, at no less than 20% of total budgets.** The three subprogram goals noted in the 2013 grant had meeting budgets in the 18% - 23% range. CLUA might consider asking Samdhana for a more specific plan on pursuing leadership development within these regional networks.

Next steps for Samdhana:
- Pursue better empirical documentation that land rights help secure and enhance forest carbon stocks *at broader landscape levels* via current mapping efforts;
- Help communities take advantage of new income opportunities to make the case for a better and broader rural development paradigm.

Next steps for CLUA:
- CLUA and Ford Foundation's grantmaking developing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and a cadre of professionals in the ADR space is an important and necessary adjunct to its small-grants program with Samdhana.

- CLUA's new Indonesia coordinator might spend some time understanding opportunities for engaging three sectors together—indigenous, agrarian reform, and environment+ conservation, and in particular, find ways to sharpen their joint messaging and ability to communicate with consistent themes. All three sectors might first try engaging together around their shared understanding of regional opportunities to influence *tata ruang* processes. Another possible project would be a survey of the regional configurations of talent, existing support, and *kaderisasi* that exist in the different AMAN, KPA, and WALHI regional offices, emphasizing CLUA's geographic priorities—with analysis done at the *kabupaten*–by-*kabupaten* level.

- CLUA should dialogue with Samdhana, *pemerintah daerah,* and other donors (NORAD, NCFI, MAC Foundation, Ecosystem Partnership Fund, etc.) around these larger-scale opportunities for gazetting *adat* lands, if possible creating a matrix of highest-priority efforts for the next 24 months.

GLOSSARY

Adat	Indigenous; hence *hukum adat* (customary law); *wilayah adat* (indigenous territories); *desa adat* (indigenous village); and *masyarakat adat* (indigenous peoples).
BRWA	Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat – a partnership between the national indigenous federation and civil society groups involved with mapping and spatial planning, using the same scales and GIS technologies as those of the national planning and land registration agencies.
Bappeda	National Planning Agency
Dinas Kehutanan	Provincial/*kabupaten* levels of the Forest Ministry
DPRD	Regency-level parliaments
Izin	Permission; used in the context of land-use licensing
Jaringan	Network
KKN – Korupsi, Kolusi, dan Nepotisme KPK – Komisi Kebarantasan Korupsi	Term indicating forms of corruption. The body dealing with these issues is the KPK.
Kabupaten	Regency; key unit of land use planning and the granting of izin. The head of a kabupaten is a *Bupati,* a post that has become vastly more powerful and important over the last decade in terms of land administration.
Kaderisasi	Building the cadre – term used to refer to recruitment of new talent into the NGO sector.
Kawasan hutan	Forest area; specifically, the lands managed by the Department of Forestry. Decisions as to whether certain lands are inside or outside the *kawasan hutan* are critical for determining lines of authority for granting or rescinding land-use permits. The lack of clarity regarding

	kawasan hutan boundaries has been one of Indonesia's abiding sources of corruption.
Kepala Desa	Village Head
MK35	2013 Constitutional Court ruling stating that *wilayah adat* is not part of *kawasan hutan* and thus the Ministry of Forestry cannot exercise control over *adat* lands.
MP3EI	Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesian Economic Growth
NKB12 (Nota Kesepahaman Bersama 12)	An MOU agreed to by twelve national ministries regarding forest land use; an important example of policy coordination that effectively limits the bureau-cratic reach of the Ministry of Forestry, which until recently exercised unchallenged power over approximately 70% of Indonesia's territory (viz., the *kawasan hutan*).
Otonomi daerah	Regional autonomy; the post-Suharto political framework of administrative devolution.
Pemerintah	Government. Further refined as *pemerintah pusat* (central government) and *pemerintah daerah* (local government).
Peraturan Daerah (Perda)	Local administrative rulemaking, usually at the *kabupaten* level, requiring agreement from both the Bupati and the regional parliament (DPRD).
Perusahaan	Private sector companies; used to designate large-scale entities.
Simpul Layanan Pemataan Partisipatif	SLPP -- Voluntary Cartography Teams
Surat Keputusan	An administrative decision issued by a *Bupati*.
Tata Ruang	Spatial planning
UKP4	Unit Kerja Presiden bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan; Presidential Task Force on Development Monitoring and Oversight
Undang-Undang Desa	Village Law
Undang Undang 21 Otonomi Khusus Papua	Law on Special Autonomy for Papua

EVALUATION

OVERVIEW. This evaluation covers five years of collaboration between Samdhana Institute and the Climate and Land Use, with specific reference to CLUA's support for Samdhana's administration of a small grants program with substantial regranting of CLUA funds to partners in the field. The evaluation pays particular attention to the most recent CLUA grant to Samdhana for its small-grants program, which was substantially larger than previous grants.[ii]

A critical finding from this evaluation—one that will be repeatedly referenced in the report—is that CLUA's support for a Samdhana-administered 'small grants program' went far beyond merely the funding of a low-overhead re-granting effort. Rather, Samdhana Institute consistently and successfully implemented the program as a 'total support package' that included not only modest pots of money for field projects, but also mentoring, training, and technical assistance to NGO and *pemerintah daerah* partners; networking support and dissemination of information between grantee partners; as well as monitoring and strategic evaluation of these small grants. One of Samdhana's defining features as an NGO is its cultivation and use of 'Fellows'. These 'Fellows' operate across different geographies and bring different types of technical expertise to the table. Fellows are not Samdhana staff; they have other 'day jobs' in civil society, research institutions, or implementing donor-led projects; and while paid daily rates by Samdhana for specific services rendered, they are also not dependent on the institute for employment. In general, they are 'veterans' of Indonesian civil society's long struggle for land rights and economic justice, highly esteemed by colleagues.

Samdhana Fellows greatly increase the institute's horizontal networking capacity and its ability to transfer skills to start-up NGOs as well as to local governments (who have not been provided with formal capacity-building supports in any reasonable relation to the new administrative burdens placed upon them in the post-Suharto era of *otonomi daerah*). This horizontal networking capacity has meant that Samdhana Fellows have been exceptional nimble at plugging into the new structures created under President Yudhoyono, such as the Presidential Task Force UKP4 and the new National REDD+ Agency. Most importantly, the ability to deploy Fellows flexibly and immediately into particular problem areas has made it possible for Samdhana (as noted in their December 2012 proposal) to "make best use of development opportunities as they arise."

> **Value-add of Samdhana Small Grants**
>
> - Capacity building through writing and mapping workshops
> - Strategic and timely financial support to key groups
> - Mentoring support to field NGOs
> - Samdhana providing grantees access to key political/research arenas
> - Broad networking / movement building to address resource conflicts
> - Flexibility in response to new political opportunities as they arise

The most recent CLUA grant to Samdhana mirrored CLUA's shift away from an exclusive focus on REDD+ mechanisms and territories and toward a stronger focus on deforestation drivers--primarily in the plantation (oil palm) and pulp & paper sectors. Over the last year, CLUA expected through this grant to enable Samdhana to make roughly 20 grants in the USD$5 - $15K range, and four larger grants of $35K to

$55K.[iii] This expectation is confirmed. Samdhana through its small grants also honored CLUA's confirmed geographic priorities of Central Kalimantan, Jambi, and Papua provinces, with additional support earmarked for groups in West Kalimantan and Riau, provinces also characterized by intense forest conflict and the massive expansion of industrial concessions.

Earlier CLUA grants to Samdhana reflected a shared concern for REDD+ (Reduction in Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation). At the 2007 UNFCCC Bali Conference of Parties, Indonesian civil society was essentially united *in opposition* to REDD+. This reflected civil society's previous experience with 'land-grabbing'—and REDD's heavy promotion/capture by the Ministry of Forestry at that time suggested to most that REDD would just be a new source of community disempowerment. But the high level of anxiety around REDD also reflected civil society's low level of understanding of this newly-proposed mechanism.[iv]

Samdhana recognized however that REDD+ could provide a cross-cutting and consistent framework for engagement on land rights—a different approach from wearying and non-scalable 'retail' engagement on individual industrial land plantation projects. At that time—referred to by several respondents as 'the era of the carbon cowboys'—there was very little objective information available about REDD, apart from that provided by project developers (which also included responsible conservation groups seeking funds for the development of new REDD+ projects). In the two years following the Bali COP, Samdhana received support from CLUA to carry out broader education on climate change and REDD+, and re-granted funds to key provincial NGOs to extend that awareness out to communities likely to be the subjects of REDD+ project attention. A subsequent grant saw a shift toward REDD preparedness and engagement in the broader context of dealing with threats to land and livelihoods, where 'REDD readiness' also meant the ability to engage with Indonesia's on-going spatial planning process known as *tata ruang*. Fortunately, Samdhana had the infrastructure basis for doing small grants, coming out of the USAID and (later) DFID-funded Kemala experience, with which Samdhana Executive Director Nonette Royo was involved.

Indonesian civil society's journey on REDD+, from the Bali COP in 2007 to the announcement of a creation of a national REDD+ agency in 2012, can be summarized as one of moving from an intransigent stance of "No Rights, No REDD", to one of being able to make informed choices about both rights *and* REDD.

Overall, the REDD+ 'conversation' had by 2012 left a very positive impact on Indonesia, even if it hadn't resulted in the successful establishment of that many REDD+ project areas. REDD+ was important to catalyzing President Yudhoyono's emissions-reduction commitment, and hugely important in getting other ministries to develop their own expertise on *tata ruang*, no longer just leaving it up to the superior bureaucratic infighters at the Ministry of Forestry, that heretofore had attempted to dominate the national conversation on land use.

Four dramatic developments in 2013 changed the Indonesian political landscape for all parties, including CLUA and Samdhana. Two decisions were administrative, one was legislation (for which implementation rules have not yet been written), and one via the Constitutional Court. In February twelve ministries, mostly with territorial or infrastructure interests, agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding (NKB 12). The KPK (anti-corruption commission) had an equal seat at the table, which was seen as highly significant.[v]

Second, in May the Constitutional Court applied Judicial Review to some parts of Act No. 41/1999 on Forestry (Undang-Undang Kehutanan or UUK), declaring that indigenous peoples' customary forests should not be classed as *kawasan hutan,* that is, State Forest Areas (controlled by the Ministry of Forestry). The new REDD+ Agency was launched in September this year, and new legislation on Village Law (*Undang-Undang Desa*) this November completed a year of remarkable change.

Of the four events, the Constitutional Court decision is arguably the most significant, since it should provide avenues for the recognition of community management rights for *adat* communities. It has resulted in a strategic shift away from the territorial focus on REDD+ to examining two specific opportunities: a) help AMAN and JKPP to map larger-scale territories for recognition of *adat* rights in response to MK 35; and b) link to subnational low-carbon development strategies, characterized by development approaches other than deforestation-related exports of wood and plantation products. Samdhana evolved sharply in 2013 to show greater orientation toward specific policy settings, based on the important changes in the landscape that occurred during the year. It gives Samdhana the oppor-tunity to 'play offense' in political spaces afforded by *tata ruang*; those created by the Constitutional Court decision; through creation of the new National REDD+ Agency; through outputs from the Presidential Task Force UPK4; and *via* the anti-corruption body KPK. Fellows have been asked to sit on bodies giving formalized input into these processes.

Samdhana and CLUA share the strategic understanding that secure community land rights and resource tenure are necessary conditions for arresting deforestation.

MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS OF EVALUATION:

a) Samdhana's strategy of working with JKPP and AMAN is a very good investment and provides the best hope for successful 'bottom-up' use of new pathways created in 2013 toward recognizing land rights. JKPP and AMAN are both high-capacity partners at the moment.

b) The small grants program's highest leverage is in Papua and West Papua provinces, where a strategy of working ~50% with civil society groups, and ~50% local government (usually from the local forest administration) plus two universities, has provided tremendous opportunities for synergy with the **newly-published SRAP** (*Strategi and Rencana Aksi Proponsi* on low carbon development.) CLUA's consistent support to development of the Papua Province low carbon development plan is a huge win. Samdhana has built an infrastructure to take this partnership much further.

c) **Next steps for Samdhana:** pursuing better empirical documentation that land rights help secure and enhance forest carbon stocks *at broader landscape levels* via current mapping efforts**;** helping communities take advantage of new income opportunities to make the case for a better and broader rural development paradigm. These steps are discussed in the closing section of this report.

Analysis of Specific Aspects of the Small Grant Portfolio
Evaluator conducted structured interviews with representatives with twenty+ Samdhana small grant recipient organizations, as well as with personnel from three out of the four mid-sized grants. (I spent a

great deal of time with Samdhana mapping partner JKPP in Riau and West Kalimantan, and some with regional AMAN partners – the two main partners of Samdhana.)

Small grant recipients were each asked a standard set of questions, reproduced as Appendix A, that served as the basis for further inquiry.   These basic questions allowed for a ranking of the 'most useful' parts of engagement with Samdhana, as seen from grantee perspectives.   Unsurprisingly, 'small grant' (i.e., financial support) itself ranked highest. Amazingly, no small grant recipient complained about not getting enough money from Samdhana—they just acknowledged grants were small. Samdhana appears to have been quite transparent about the sources of funds (CLUA, NORAD, Ecosystem Alliance, etc.) — and used discussion of the grant as an opportunity for dialogue on strategic opportunities.

A remarkably close second in the ranking was 'networking support'. This stems from two factors. Building and maintaining networks has been an enormous challenge in this archipelago nation, and NGOs here routinely under-budget for coordination functions.   Miscommunication and the subsequent lack of opportunities to work problems out in face-to-face settings has doomed many a *jaringan* to slow and painful death. Samdhana Institute has line items in their budget for these kinds of multi-group strategy meetings, and the meetings appear to be run effectively. Respondents expressed wonder that not only did Samdhana budget adequately for such strategic workouts, the institute also kept money aside to respond to requests from the field for tactical meetings on an ad-hoc basis. (Mentors in the field would vet these request, and usually would add his/her expertise to the framing of the questions at hand.) Second, it has been exceptionally rare for NGO networks in Indonesia to develop effective role differentiation, and I read the appreciation of networking support as an appreciation of Samdhana's ability to organize groups while also simultaneous *not* needing to 'brand' the effort as an institute initiative, so that the *jaringan* maintains solidarity as a 'leaderless' network, while in actual practice most often than not functioning using a 'hub and spoke' network model.[vi]   **Recommendation**: **maintain line-item budget support for regional planning meetings, and tactical meeting money enabling fast responses to the rapidly changing set of new tenure opportunities, at no less than 20% of total budgets.**   The three subprogram goals noted in the 2013 grant had meeting budgets in the 18% - 23% range.   CLUA might consider asking Samdhana for a more specific plan for structuring leadership development opportunities within these regional networks.

Samdhana strives to reduce 'distance', and the perception of role difference, from its partners, for program purposes. Donors meanwhile are attracted to Samdhana's efficient and effective administration of small grants programs. This can reinforce a perception of 'gate-keeping'. Samdhana appears to weather this contradiction extremely well.   Samdhana probably has the institutional maturity (and the luxury of a choice of donor partners) to reject support that seeks to push the institute merely into cheap re-granting functions; while at the same time, because Samdhana doesn't need to stick a label on what it is doing, donors may not always sufficiently appreciate the 'non-grant' portions of the institute's value-add. "Leading from behind" usually means 'followership', but this is actually a case where 'leading from behind' has worked.   **Recommendation: the current level of small-grant support is institutionally sustainable and highly necessary for the field.** Appendix C of this report is used to explore justifications

for higher per-year levels of re-granting. **Allow Samdhana continued flexibility to implement its 'total support package' approach.**

Evaluator also attempt to compare Samdhana with another small grant mechanism in Indonesia, that administered by Kemitraan. Both respondents and Kemitraan itself reported that they found Samdhana to be much faster, more flexible, and less tied to explicit strategies of the donor. Kemitraan has much deeper reporting requirements and a greater need to situate work within its own log frames. By contrast Kemitraan scored higher on its ability to introduce CSOs to government partners, particularly within the Ministry of Forestry, with which Kemitraan has a Memorandum of Understanding. In some settings, Kemitraan and Samdhana's cooperation and respective role definition has had very useful knock-on effects. Work in West Papua's Kabupaten Kaimana, where Samdhana helped with community outreach and mapping, and strengthened the relationship to the *Bupati*, while Kemitraan was able to take the *kabupaten* proposal and seek political daylight at higher levels of government -- clearing the way for its acceptance – was cited as one example. Kemitraan further stated that Samdhana's value-add to them was to pick up where Kemitraan lacks the financial and field-staff resources to help particular partners. (Kemitraan has a specific program on Forestry and Community-based Natural Resource Management, with more personnel in Jakarta.)

In sum, Kemitraan uses a more 'classic' re-granting approach – if you get support from Kemitraan, from then on you are on your own to execute that which you contracted to do. In the final analysis, Kemitraan is seen as important for capacity building, but that it stands outside 'the movement', whereas Samdhana is inside the movement. So they play different roles and donors working with both organiza-tions should be mindful of this fact.

The CLUA grant to Samdhana also includes a line-item for mentoring support. Small grant recipients/ respondents were less clear on the value of Mentors, who may be either Samdhana staff, Fellows or their cohorts.[vii]   There is some organizational risk that mentors are being spread too thin, since all of these high-capacity individuals are in high demand. Samdhana references a network of around fifty Fellows, a subset of whom interacted with CLUA-supported activities – and in some cases are Samdhana Fellows while also leading institutions that receive funding from CLUA and CLUA member foundations. The most significant mentoring support for CLUA small grant partners came from these Fellows[viii]: Martua Sirait (Kalimantan), Arief Wicaksono (Sumatra), Ita Natalia (Papua), and at the national level Pete Wood, Hapsono, and Noer Fauzi, plus Samdhana staff. Support to Mentors is intelligently structured: they receive basic stipends plus a travel allowance, and can bill up to 5 days / month with no questions or approvals needed—that's part of the overall duty. Above and beyond five days/month, they must seek pre-approval from the institute It wasn't clear to the evaluator how those five days were allocated, and it also means that in areas with dense program engagements, namely Sumatra and Kalimantan, Mentorship is thinly spread. This is the least 'scale-able' aspect of Samdhana's work.

As noted, if a Fellow sees something trending they feel is particularly important as either opportunity or threat (or both), they can make a request to the meeting fund to convene partners on the question ('facilitative meetings' is the term used by Samdhana). I perceived very little resentment of the

'gatekeeper role' played by Mentors, given that Samdhana 'calls for proposals' with respect to CLUA and NPORAD are not open calls – proposals must go through a Fellow, Advisor/Consultant, as well as a senior staff member -- so the Fellows often play very strong roles in shaping regional (Kalimantan, Papua, Sumatra) strategy. Some respondents perceive Samdhana as 'playing favorites', with a strong bias toward those who already agree with the institute's approaches, with consequently less willingness to engage partners who might challenge them at the strategic level. In conclusion, then, despite a strong adherence to overall Samdhana strategy by the Mentors, the institute's programs do get translated through the personalities and priorities of these individuals; and mentorship is a loose concept in the minds of small-grant recipients. Samdhana's fellows, staff, and consultants have had to respond opportunistically to breaking developments, as outlined above and as befits a political strategy operating in 'real time'. Sometimes this may cause misgivings among partner organizations, given legitimate reasons to wonder what 'hat' a particular Mentor is wearing at the time of his/her engagement. This has made some government officials more wary about engaging with Samdhana Fellows—particularly with entities like the Ministry of Forestry who are used to being able to sort civil society groups into discrete categories. This appears not to be the case in Papua, one reason that these provinces are showing national leadership on building ground-up relations with *Dinas Kehutanan* and the associated KPH's (forest management units).

Samdhana failed to meet one of the criteria for success found in its earlier proposals to CLUA – a criteria dropped from more recent grant metrics. Samdhana suggested in 2009 that it would 'graduate' about 30% of its CLUA small grantees a year – suggesting that with forty grantees in 2009, only fifteen would still be in the 2011 cohort, and only five organizations receiving grant dollar support in 2009 would still be receiving that support from Samdhana today. In actual practice, the figures were lower— 'gradu-ation' rates appear to be more like 50% over the entire five-year period, as opposed to 30% per year. It's important to unpack why, but the Evaluator does not judge this as an important failure:

- First, many 2009 partners did 'graduate' in the sense of then going on to get bigger grants from other donors. There are cases of successful 'graduation' to receiving direct grants from the Ford Foundation or CLUA – WARSI and CAPPA in Jambi Province, Lanting Boreno in West Kalimantan – can both be counted as success stories in this regard.[ix]
- Samdhana continued support because the project took longer, or cost more, than was expected. This was disproportionately so in cases involving mapping and where *Bupati* and other local government approvals had to be sought. Samdhana was then left with the choice between letting promising initiatives wither on the vine in order to hit a somewhat arbitrary benchmark (or worse, from a 'movement solidarity' perspective, to teach the partner a negative lesson), or to re-up for another year. Grantee partners almost always underestimated coordination costs, and failed to anticipate that embarking on intra-community processes of identifying resource rights would often unbury long-held animosities and grievances.[x] Grantees should also have reckoned on the use of stalling tactics and the deliberate vague shuffling of responsibilities between *bupatis* and *DRPD*s, and between provinces and *kabupaten*—but mostly they did not*.
- Samdhana staff argued that some partners did 'graduate' in the sense of moving up a skills ladder, but then continued to get grants. Samdhana often saw the need to help organizations reach their

next level of task sophisticated and institutional maturity. That goal works at cross-purposes to the 'graduation' benchmark. The former Project Coordinator offered this example of how and why successful capacity building is a type of 'graduation': a grantee gets support for help with community mapping, then the group is invited to take part in work on larger scale mapping and *tata ruang* processes, and then one of its staff members become part of a provincial low-carbon development planning team. The Riau NGO Yayasan Mitra Insani is a good example of this – YMI received *five* Samdhana small grants from different sources (i.e., CLUA and non-CLUA) that has ranged from work on documenting illegal logging to mapping for *hutan desa*. In Papua, we have also seen several step-wise developments of greater skill and capacity, this time including the university partners.

In sum, unless the organization had a botched leadership transition, or engaged in misrepresentation, Samdhana's instinct is to continue working with that existing group, particular in cases where the partner works in a field or specific geography that is not finding a lot of support from other donors.   Lower on the list than 'small grant' and 'networking support', and more or less tied with 'Mentoring', was small grantees' appreciation for Samdhana's support in identifying other potential sources of money. This did not appear to be formal part of the institute's work program (i.e., they didn't run fundraising seminars), but rather individual staff members and Mentors responded in an *ad hoc* manner to requests for assistance.

The institute did not have a set of metrics for when it is appropriate to 'let go' of a partner, but it did state four categories for thinking about achievement of goals with respect to capacity building:
- through development of 'front runners' in *kabupaten* and provincial policy environments;
- through movement building in the broad sense of working with different agrarian and *adat* communities;
- expansion of technical capacity and skills transmission to local NGOs, AMAN affiliates, and mapping teams; and
- Leadership and empowerment.

Recommendation: the focus on 'graduation' was somewhat misplaced and should be retired. However, an evaluation system needs to replace it. Future proposals should show greater concern for the 'step-wise' nature of grant expectations. Samdhana should develop a matrix for expressing skills transfer + civil society development goals in relation to regranting strategy. Samdhana might be asked to create 'tiers' for achievement, showing what tasks would be implied at different tiers. This anticipates the problem of organizations that may make for a very appropriate and strategic small grant partner but turn out to be problematic if asked to manage a broader program on its own.

The following sections look at particular work areas supported by CLUA small grants.

Mapping.   Samdhana's two most significant national partners are the national indigenous federation AMAN (Alliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara) and the mapping network JKPP (Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan

Participatif). The three organizations are tightly knit together in an effort called BRWA (*Badan Registrasi Wilayah Adat*), which responds to a door opened by UPK4, and would allow for *adat* communities to finally get 'on the map' and increase the likelihood that the territories they traditionally manage(d) would be recognized by government. This is also a good example of how Samdhana has adroitly used flexibility both in the form of providing *medium-sized* grants and in the different *partnering styles* used with these medium-sized grants.

A $50,000 grant JKPP provides various methods and resources for participatory mapping, usually including support from one of its 17 voluntary SLPP cartography teams (*Simpul Layanan Pemataan Partisipatif*). The medium-sized grant also allows JKPP to interact with the national cartography agency *Badan Informasi Geospatial* (BIG), developing maps that can be digitized and made both available to and useable by state land administration agencies.[xi] UPK4 has requested up-to-date maps of *adat* territory, providing a place for civil society and the aspirations of indigenous people to be taken seriously around this territorialization project. This has been strengthened with the MK 35 decision. With respect to local governments, Samdhana's medium-sized grant to Forest Watch Indonesia enables work with *Bupati*s, so that these local leaders track the land allocation and verification process, feel more comfort-able in terms of the information they control, and thus more confident in making recommendations to the central government, minimizing the possibility that they would become the subject of KKN (anti-corruption) inquiries.

Mapping is being carried out both small (*desa*) and larger scales. Medium-sized grants are critical for larger-scale work; *desa* level mapping is an appropriate point of entry for skills development. Community mapping has a long history in Indonesia; it also has a long history of not amounting very much, politically. "We were getting communities on the map," noted a JKPP staffer long involved in this effort, "but realized you couldn't get to the forty million acres of *adat* claims nationwide by mapping one village at a time." Consequently, and after considerable deliberation, Samdhana and its partners co-developed with Mac Chapin, a version of the 'Native Lands' approach to larger-scale mapping of indigenous territory. Chapin was directly involved in the Kalimantan Barat and Papua mapping efforts. **Recommendation: Samdhana and CLUA should have a strong strategic sense of when and where to apply larger-scale mapping efforts.** Three dimensions of this include: a) where capacity building and leadership opportunities will make the biggest difference; b) where Bupatis are sympathetic and will support the process;[xii] and c) where the SLPP mapping team has consolidated into a force that JKPP (and others) can build upon.

Large-scale mapping also ends up showing territories other than ones you control—and which are generally controlled by the large palm oil and pulp & paper *perusahaan* (APRIL, APP etc.). This inherently politicizes the result. Mapping that encompasses thousands of hectares can also result in more complicated intra- and intertribal negotiations between villages (and ethnic groups) that claim the same territory.
Currently three large-scale mapping efforts are under way – in Talang Mamak (Riau), Kapuas Hulu (West Kalimantan), and Merauke (Papua). Evaluator attended two large-scale mapping exercises, first in Talang Mamak, then in Kapuas Hulu. Talang Mamak refers to an indigenous territory – an 'imagined community', to use Benedict Anderson's memorable phrase – while Kapuas Hulu refers to a *kabupaten* and thus a

designation of bounded administrative territory. In the Kapuas Hulu case, a particular community had long been agitating for recognition of their adat rights, but in response the *Bupati* there said he wasn't willing to grant designation for one such territory—he wanted to see a larger-scale effort, and thus ultimately 17 communities from two different tribes. This slowed the process down. The difference between the two situations was immediately apparent: the entire mapping process will probably take only six months in Talang Mamak, since there's been no engagement with administration yet[xiii] and no complicated intertribal negotiations; while it has taken eighteen months (and counting) to get anywhere close to an agreed map in Kapuas Hulu.[xiv]

Evaluator also carried out a ranking exercise of the different areas of political engagement – based on the schema reproduced here as Appendix B – in which CLUA small grant recipients were asked to identify their priorities for engagement. Mapping was deemed far and away the highest priority activity for these field-based NGOs, and it corresponds to new political opportunities occasioned by Constitu-tional Court decision MK 35, by UPK4's "One Map" effort, and by the NKB12 agreement on *tata ruang.* Among other impacts, **the MK 35 decision[xv] heightened and clarified the need for collaboration between field NGOs and national NGOs, and between the indigenous and environment movements; responding to the impacts of this crucial political development should be at the heart of CLUA's Indonesia strategy moving forward.**

Work with Indigenous Peoples
AMAN has become one of Indonesia's better-functioning network organizations, and Samdhana has been critical to their development of both implementation capacity and political strategy – taking *masyarakat adat* 'wish lists' with respect to territorial claims, and translating them into appropriate targets for small grant program support. (AMAN also receives core support from CLUA member Ford Foundation.) Critically, according to AMAN's Executive Director, Samdhana has helped AMAN to "take money out of the equation in such a way that allows us to act more as a social movement"— AMAN prefers not to be identified as a donor/re-grantor wherever possible.   Samdhana's facilitation of small grants to AMAN partners has also relieved the federation of significant administrative burdens, which over the years it has struggled with greatly. Finally, AMAN expressed support for the fact that Samd-hana introduced them to larger-scale mapping approaches that generate less intercommunal conflict than approaches previously used, and gratitude that Samdhana has been facilitative of AMAN processes without trying to mess with their structure.

AMAN's consistent and constant request is that the land be returned to adat control, and/or that appropriate compensation for damages should be awarded to communities affected by land grabs or environmental pollution. AMAN is committed to the pursuit of broader *Hutan Adat* strategies as a mechanism recognizing not just rights, but a degree of legal *sovereignty* over territories, as is the case for example with the Philippines Ancestral Land Domain claims mechanism. As a result control functions would be exercised through *adat* leadership, not through the state-administered village (*desa*) system. The situation became more complicated in December 2013, with the passage of a new Village Law (*Undang-Undang Desa*), which (depending on how administrative rules are ultimately written) will allow for a new mechanism of *Desa Adat*. *Kabupaten* are supposed to issue regulations that will distinguish

'regular' villages from *Desa Adat*; and while *Desa Adat* will also need to have mapped and registered boundaries, it would empower indigenous communities to use traditional leadership (*ketua adat*) as their source of government representation and negotiation with higher levels of government. But only some *adat* areas have maps—and even fewer have decided to draw specific boundaries on those maps, which is required for registration as *desa adat.* This process is supposed to be undertaken, and completed, in this year (2014), but no one expects this to happen. However, the idea of combining *hutan adat* and *desa adat* into a single package of territorial management and control, based on customary rights, is compelling, and will likely occupy a considerable portion of AMAN's and Samdhana's strategic thinking and discussion over the coming year. A civil society team that includes Samdhana Fellow Noer Fauzi as a leading member has been invited to give input to the writing of administrative rules for implementing *Udang-Udang Desa*.

Work with government

Evaluator did not get a strong picture of Samdhana's work directly with government agencies. I visited several *kabupaten* agencies accompanied by small grant partners, but in general those local government linkages were forged by the grantees themselves, not by Samdhana. Several respondents acknowledged a Samdhana role in helping them get meetings with higher-level officials, but this was not often and not cited as a particularly important source of support. Respondents more often cited the importance of Samdhana's role in helping them get in front of donors. Kemitraan was more often mentioned as playing the role of helping partners to interface with central government authorities. The exception to this general characterization is Samdhana's work in Papua, due largely to the opportunities afforded by Papua's special law on regional autonomy.[xvi] About half of the small grants made by Samdhana in 2013 to partners in Papua have gone to university programs or local government units.

Work at the provincial level

Samdhana's 2012 grant reporting to CLUA noted increasing encouragement of grantees working together on regional strategies. Strategies differ greatly from province to province, so it's important to note at the outset what each has in common:

- They use *spatial information* to document areas of actual/ongoing/potential *community management and control;* those results become the basis for broader engagement in *national social and economic policy-making.*
- They target license holders, pursue audits/engagements with *perusahaan*, showing areas of environmental damage, as well as criminality (or at a minimum, use of land not sanctioned in existing licenses)*.*
- They evince a deep concern for conflict resolution in the *kawasan hutan* – although the ways in which that work is carried out varies greatly between them.

Strategic differences in province-level engagement are based on –
- NGO capacity, including the existence (or lack) of a leading NGO or NGO network for the province.
- Relationships between governors and bupatis. Central Kalimantan for example has a Governor willing to take risks and experiment with multistakeholder fora, while *Bupati*s in the province are

hanging onto their right to carry out licensing of their own. By contrast, in West Kalimantan, the Governor is doing his utmost to override the decision-making authorities of Bupatis sympa-thetic to NGO and *masyarakat adat* positions but who for longer-term career reasons may be unwilling to get crosswise with their governor. (Papua is a special case due to the *Undang Undang Otonomi Khusus Papua*.)

Samdhana strategy in **Kalimantan** represents the clearest articulation of the move away from the 'top-down, exo-development approach [to REDD+] based on sales of carbon without engaging with community management approaches that already exist in the field.'[xvii] Spatial (*tata ruang*) issues returned to the fore in 2013 period as attention to REDD project areas faded somewhat. Indeed, the failure of 'exo-REDD' allowed Samdhana partners in Kalimantan to focus more on the basic struggle for management and control of community lands. (Disregarding overlapping claims, 92% of the lands in West Kalimantan are under some sort of plantation or mining licensing scheme.)

Samdhana strategy in **Sumatera** includes more formal attention to conflict resolution, including the use and articulation of safeguards; and a greater willingness/ability to use the language of climate change mitigation, and sustainable forest management, in framing the development decisions in play in Riau, Jambi, and North Sumatra.   The plantation sector is longer-established in Sumatra, although it is still expanding, and expanding particularly into peat-swamp areas; there is also a great deal more economic in-migration. Community conflicts therefore more often take the form of *masyarakat adat* versus newcomers, with a different dynamic from the intertribal conflicts that make large-scale mapping tasks a greater chore in Kalimantan.

Papua represents a very different set of opportunities for Samdhana.   There is substantially less immediate civil society capacity to work with in Papua, and a much deeper basis of grievances directed at the central government.[xviii] Consequently, Samdhana has made a major commitment of staff time in Papua, and they play very different roles as mentors there. Recently, Samdhana brought on full time native Papuan coordinator, Yunus Yumte.   Both Nonette Royo and Senior Samdhana Staff Member Ita Natalia continue to spend chunks of time in the provinces of Papua and Papua Barat, and have invested considerably in linking to Foker LSM, Rainforest Foundation Norway's key partner in Papua, plus networks such as AFP3. This year's small grant investments are also going to *kabupaten* forestry departments and to other local government bodies that are shrewdly negotiating the contested legal space between *Undang-Udang 21 Otonomi Daerah Khusus Papua* and the 1999 Forestry Law, by assuming that the Autonomy Law gives them the right to issue *izin* while using the Forest Department's basic local management units (KPH) to carry out activities that are sanctioned by the Forest Law.

Meanwhile, under a separate grant, CLUA's support for the drafting of a Papua Province Low-Carbon Development Plan (*Strategi dan Rencana Aksi Propinsi,* or SRAP) is a success, as the plan has just now been published and indicates the kind of development direction sought by President Yudhoyono and his UPK4 team. Five *kabupaten* in the province are now able to build upon this low carbon development planning work carried out at the provincial level—providing cross-cutting value to two different CLUA engagements. By contrast, Samdhana reports that none of the other provincial SRAPs have built their

analysis and recommendations on existing Ministry of Forestry mechanisms; nor do they suggest building on *adat* mechanisms to the extent that the Papua plan does.

Several parties noted the overriding importance of Papua as a place to work, due to its relatively intact forest systems – while also noting that Papua has been a graveyard for project thinking over the years, with donors, government, and grantees all discouraged. There is a strong sense amongst national partners with whom I spoke that Samdhana is one of the few entities that has cracked the question of how to work in Papua productively with both government and Papuan civil society. **Recommendation: CLUA small grants support for work in Papua should be continued and if possible expanded.**

Work on media and communications. Indonesian civil society is grossly under-invested in strategic communications. This is ironic in that Indonesia might have the most free-wheeling media space in Asia today, outside of Hong Kong, and an extremely deep penetration of social media as compared to other countries of similar *per capita* income. It appears that Samdhana is also under-invested in strategic communications. There are several possible explanations for this. First, none of their Mentors with whom I interacted come from strong communication backgrounds. Mainstream journalists will often seek out Samdhana Fellows for story quotes, and several have the ability to place high-profile op-eds in key newspapers--[xix] but their fellows aren't reporters.

Samdhana has tried to support NGOs to develop websites and informational clearinghouses covering entire regions – one hub each to serve all of Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Papua -- but in practice, these efforts have reflected much more the political and institutional happenings in the organization's home province (WALHI West Sumatra, LPS-Air for Kalimantan Barat, MNUKWAR for Papua Barat, respectively). Finally, there is an important question of consistency of tone. I participated in a very interesting discussion with Sumatra partners as to whether the kinds of mapping and safeguards 'positive frame' work that small-grant partners were carrying out was actually supported, or undermined, by the kinds of 'feet to the fire' communications pursued by activist NGO and network partners. **Recommendation: Samdhana could do much more to be linking up with other CLUA strategic media partners in Indonesia, namely InterMatrix and Mongabay-Indonesia; it might also pursue the idea of recruiting Fellows specializing in media and communications.**

Final note
This evaluation lacks a specific section regarding Samdhana's role in engaging the private sector (primarily with respect to land licensing), which is a major CLUA-Indonesia strategy area. Field inquiry suggested first that Samdhana and its partners simply found fewer opportunities to engage directly with *perusahaan,* and second, that new opportunities opened up by *MK 35* and *Hutan Desa* took precedent and swamped other work areas. However, Samdhana's 31 Jan 2014 grant reporting to CLUA asserted that Strategy 2, "engaging effectively with forestry and plantation license holders," accounted for fully 25% of the budget.[xx] That level of engagement was not supported by my (admittedly limited) field inquiry, and thus it is not clear to me how this figure was arrived at. I asked several respondents about this and in general, they waved the question off by saying that they didn't see the distinction between *pemerintah* and *perusahaan* as all that meaningful—that most successful conflict resolution work is going to be trilateral

in nature (government, private firms, civil society). But it would be useful to get a better picture from Samdhana about how they see this work fitting into their overall small-grants effort, or whether CLUA support should really focus more specifically on workstreams pertaining to CLUA-Indonesia key strategies one and two.

BEYOND CLUA

The 'Beyond CLUA' section of the 2013-2016 CLUA-Indonesia strategy document takes aim at three longer-term objectives required for meeting the 41% GHG reduction national target: a 'whole of government' approach to rural development; the mainstreaming of low-emission economic development models; and a mandatory national framework for private-sector good practice.   This section comments on those objectives, how Samdhana is situated with respect to these goals, and how they pertain to CLUA's future relationship with the institute.

Whole of government approach to rural development. At the outset of his Presidency, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono called for seven million hectares of land to be clarified or transferred to farmers and communities under a program of agrarian reform (*Pembaruan Agrarian Nasional*). And while the program's political center was in the Java heartland, most of the acreage to be counted toward that seven million hectare goal was to come from forest frontier areas, including *adat* sites and sites eyed for restoration or replanting.

CLUA has focused on forests rights, and Samdhana is co-developed with AMAN a high-functioning structure poised to respond to the MK 35 constitutional court ruling to secure forest rights. SBY and his allies may have a political need to show progress on *adat* and administrative devolution going into the general election, so we may see progress on *Wilayah Adat* and *Hutan Desa* in some areas. But vested interests, a deteriorating macroeconomic position, and an overall loss of steam in SBY's broad governing coalition has prevented the broader process of agrarian reform announced in 2007 from moving forward in a meaningful way.   KPA (*Koalisi Pembangunan Agraria*), the agrarian reform society coalition in Indonesia, with a stronghold in Java, has been critical of the land-titling projects carried out with World Bank support, seeing them largely as in the service of agro-industrial schemes, and they note that nothing close to seven million hectares has been transferred under the announced schemes anyway. Broad support in Java is critical to the success of any national reform movement, but so far KPA has not been able to catalyze dramatic change in the rural sector there.

One respondent suggested that thorough-going land-use reform in Indonesia will only occur when three interest groups are united on strategy – indigenous groups (such as those represented by AMAN), farmer groups (KPA), and environmentalists (in particular WALHI) – with each functioning independently at a high level. Samdhana's dedicated support to AMAN for field activities as allowed for the development of a relatively sophisticated and integrated strategy involving social preparedness, mapping, litigation, and policy advocacy for indigenous groups. [xxi]   A designated percentage of Samdhana small grants go to AMAN's provincial and kabupaten partners.[xxii]   This has been an excellent investment for improvements

in forest cover, particularly with the new REDD+ Agency establishing itself in the political landscape. But the REDD+ Agency itself doesn't have the necessary 'throw-weight' to suggest policies that change the overall development direction toward low carbon growth.

CLUA has had less engagement with pure 'agrarian reform' movement partners. Samdhana has provided support to the NGO SAINS for analysis and capacity-building work with Samdhana partners regarding the content of the MP3EI Master Plan for growth, and both KPA and Sains play important roles representing farmers' interests from the country's rice heartlands (irrigated, individual-plot-level acreage, especially in Java/Bali and southern Sulawesi). Meanwhile, WALHI is under new management. Several WALHI regional affiliates are Samdhana small grant recipients from the CLUA budget. An urban constituency strongly supports the work of some of the international conservation NGOs, as well—in particular WWF, Greenpeace, and FOE affiliate WALHI.

Recommendation: new Indonesia coordinator should spend some time **understanding opportunities for engaging three sectors together**—**indigenous, agrarian reform, and environment + conservation**, and in particular, find ways to sharpen their joint messaging and ability to communicate with consistent themes. All three sectors might first try engaging together around their shared understanding of regional opportunities to influence *tata ruang* processes.   Another possible project would be a survey of the regional configurations of talent, existing support, and *kaderisasi* that exist in the different AMAN, KPA, and WALHI regional offices, emphasizing CLUA's geographic priorities—with analysis done at the *kabupaten*–by-*kabupaten* level.

The NKB12 agreement on *tata ruang* is as close to a 'whole of government' approach to rural develop-ment as Indonesia will see in the time period covered by CLUA strategy. Regions are implicated in MP3EI's vision *via* the *tata ruang* process, which describes provincial/regional 'comparative advantage' with reference to global commodity markets. CLUA's and Samdhana's best response would be to **support, in the next nine months, a learning process with these three sectors (adat/agrarian/ enviro), that pursues as an output a coherent alternative vision to the MP3EI, so as to present for discussion and debate to the media, and to the new government in 4Q2104/1Q2015.**

Mainstreaming innovative low-carbon economic development strategies.
The above section suggested that meaningful large-scale change in the rural sector depends on a more integrated strategy, as a precondition for mainstreaming low-carbon economic development into what is otherwise a fairly extractive vision (MP3EI) of the near-term future for Indonesia's political economy. This section notes that there are a plethora of new administrative mechanisms for securing access to forests and land title.   There are important learnings emerging from CLUA and Samdhana experiences in Papua and elsewhere.   However, the logic of the MP3IE 'Acceleration' growth plan could overwhelm these efforts, if an unsympathetic government takes power in Indonesia later this year.

It is also important to note that the new administrative mechanisms themselves are a challenge for civil society. There is no complete consensus on the validity of the state instruments proposed, and this is a civil society that historically has defined itself in oppositional, 'movement' terms, due to its formative experience with land-grabbing and the arbitrary exercise of political power (first via *Orde Baru* rigidity; and second through the chaos that attended implementation of *otonomi daerah*).[xxiii]   Other than in protected area work (represented in the text box at right by co-management and *jasling* categories), civil society is generally not used to working side-by-side with *Dinas Kehutanan* and others on public administration questions pertaining to land. In this regard, Samdhana's small grant program has demonstrated high value, since to date it has

> **New State Designations for Forest Management – pathways to tenurial recognition and/or control**
> - *Hutan Desa* (Village Forest)
> - *Hutan Kemasyarakatan* (Forest Managed by registered user group)
> - *Hutan Tanah Rakyat* (Smallholder plantation, managed by registered user group)
> - *Kemitraan* (co-managed by local forest administration and community group)
> - *JASLING* – (demonstration areas for REDD+ and Payment for Environmental Services schemes)
> - Ecosystem Restoration concessions
> - *Hutan Adat* (category aspired to by AMAN; currently being catalogued under BRWA)

successfully straddled both **'movement' values and public administration competencies**. Partners have been willing to come together with only minimal financial support, best seen in Papua, where a serious injection of Samdhana staff time and CLUA support to two different processes—one top-down, one bottom-up—now provides the best nationwide example of how small grants can tie into a provincial planning framework, forming a vision for rural development that is more in touch with the grassroots. This kind of informed consensus will be an essential way forward on rural development. *Every other scenario involves protracted conflict*—not just between parties on the ground, but also due to central government authorities trying to 'claw back' certain rights granted to provinces and *kabupaten* under administrative devolution—creating new uncertainties for communities seeking tenurial rights.

So this alone is a big lift—connecting a set of projects on the ground with a facilitative framework at *kabupaten* and provincial levels. Still, even a significant ramp-up of *Wilayah Adat* and *Hutan Desa* designations won't necessarily be sufficient to show sufficient 'growth' and benefit to the state and local governments to allow these alternative models to prevail over the long term. This is a key concern: will indigenous territories be expected to return revenues to the state along the lines of concession models? And: will communities be incentivized to participate in REDD+ demonstration areas if the division of carbon offset revenues remains as 50% to the national government as the continued owner/operator of *kawasan hutan*, 30% to the *kabupaten,* and just 20% to the community? Finally, the Ministry of Forestry's interpretation of the MK 35 ruling suggests that *adat* territories should be seen as altogether outside of *kawasan hutan* and thus potentially subject to alienation of property and the vicissitudes of commercial, individual-title markets for land. Samdhana is fully conscious of this concern; so too is Kemitraan, which has argued that community forestry would be better off seen not primarily as a land and forest management issue, but rather prioritized as an *anti-poverty* intervention, since such interventions receive greater government attention. (SBY's agrarian reform program was sold primarily as an anti-poverty program.)

Some respondents talked about the 'failure of exogenous REDD' project as a reason to return to older and long-established forms of struggle for land rights. While understandable as a historical matter, this 'retreat' would be an unfortunate read of the situation, for two reasons. First, a great deal of work is still to be done 'test driving' the new state-sanctioned territorial designations – *via* a combination of participation in REDD+ demonstration areas, responses to the MK35 court decision, and the new legislative opportunity of an 'Udang-Udang Desa' pathway toward recognition and local control – mechanisms that, despite the many bureaucratic hurdles and 'claw-backs' barring the way, have in theory been made available for communities to use, and around which they can craft sustainable forest management plans. Creating and incentivizing community forest enterprises (CFEs) may feel like a long distance from the 'REDD+' territorial program around which this partnership was first crafted in 2009, but one follows the other logically through the process of 'endogenizing' REDD+, and bespeaks a greater level of ambition amongst Samdhana partners than merely acting as community partners in REDD+ schemes. With Samdhana as an essential thought leader, civil society groups and people's organizations have worked to transform REDD+ into something having greater relevance for communities—to break out of the REDD+ territory mode, but to take this greater diversity of tenurial instruments that came about largely through the 'REDD conversation' in Indonesia, and apply it to MK35 and 'Hutan Desa' outcomes. A second reason that the current situation is different than the previous struggle—civil society must also now contend with the specific articulation of a longer-term development strategy—the "Masterplan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesian Economic Development 2011-2015" (MP3EI), that continues to prioritize external commodity linkages and protected high rates of growth. Activists cannot ignore this overarching planning framework; they will need to figure out ways to make compelling economic arguments for community control from inside this framework, while also critiquing and challenging the raw-commodity-export model itself.

In sum, Samdhana has focused primarily on the rights dimension of forest control, and only now is in a position to act on the awareness that control by *adat* and other communities will depend in the longer term on an ability to show economic growth from these lands. Thus communities must not only show economic development, but the ability to return benefits to local governments—otherwise, the territorial project of securing rights will likely to be challenged, as in Brazil, by agribusiness interests connected to national and regional parliaments that seek to roll back the gains made by indigenous groups and other communities at the forest frontier—interests that will utilize productivity arguments that are compelling to a state now charting an 8%-per-year growth path.

The best method to challenge the current development concept, then, is for more community forest enterprises (CFEs) to stand themselves up and assist in the process of development of 'endogenous REDD' ideas. AMAN spoke of a need 'to access communities through sustainable forest management conversations'. Registering such territories will require management plans and management bodies (either *adat* or multi-stakeholder partnerships centered around CFEs), including an understanding of both NTFP potentials and restoration components. AMAN representatives have staked out their tactical position by stating in conversation with government officials that 'if you recognize us as owners, we can comply with the specific economic regulations are put in place'.

Mandatory national private-sector good practice.
Indigenous peoples sit atop 60-70% of the best forest lands in Indonesia. Other than in Papua provinces, primary forests outside of *adat* territories and national protected areas have mostly vanished from the archipelago. There is a sense of crisis in terms of land availability for livelihoods.

This has translated into concerns in the field for CLUA's focus on Strategy #3, improving the sustain-ability performance of private-sector actors. Some Fellows asserted that 'sustainability targets just provide the rationale for an expansion of acreage' controlled by powerful firms connected to the MP3EI planning process. 'Sustainable commodities' was not a goal that received much support amongst Samdhana partners. The question for CLUA is whether just to note a legitimate plurality of strategies and tactics, or to engage more directly with this critique. Overall the Evaluator views as positive the scale of ambition the critique implies. It goes way beyond REDD+, or 'sustainability', and asks more basic questions about livelihoods in relation to commodity flows. It brings us back to the rural sector goals implied in the 'Beyond CLUA' section of the Indonesia strategy.

Further, 30-40% of the national land-base in Indonesia subject to consideration under 'One Map' and BRWA processes could benefit from intensive restoration efforts. Degraded lands are claimed by communities — usually *adat* communities intending to document that plantation and HPH (timber concession) actors were *illegally* occupying lands traditionally been used by these communities — or by private-sector 'ecosystem restoration' efforts, based on carbon and PES payments, that are also valid so long as FPIC approaches are used to safeguard local livelihoods. CLUA success elsewhere in the Palm Oil sector suggests that strategies of engagement with big firms are working, and should translate into new opportunities for communities and smallholder groups for participation in the future management of dispute territories. Support for processes and professionals dealing with conflict resolution, especially with respect to conflicting territorial claims, was repeatedly cited as an important resource in short supply; both **CLUA and Ford Foundation's grantmaking toward developing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and a cadre of professionals is an important and necessary adjunct to its small-grants program with Samdhana.**

Recommendation: Appendix B maps a set of political strategies to CLUA strategy and Samdhana work areas. This is an attempt to translate from the exogenous categories 'REDD+' and 'Sustainable Commodities' to the set of judicial, legislative, and administrative decisions around which civil society may have influence in the coming three to 36 months. It enables CLUA to bring politics back into strategy, although obviously the Alliance will be careful about use of that strategy mapping for broader public-consumption purposes. **Another system for monitoring Samdhana's progress at the *portfolio* level objectives is to map Samdhana and its grantees against this 10-point political strategy framework. Appendix B could be used as a template for developing CLUA performance metrics.**[xxiv] The Evaluator seeks further feedback and refinement of this chart, and comments on its potential use.

BEYOND SAMDHANA

Building the tri-legged stool of *adat,* agrarian, and environmental constituencies necessary for encouraging thorough-going land tenure reform and a shift to low-carbon development pathways is beyond the mandate and abilities of any single group. But Samdhana is probably as close to a trusted broker in this cross-sectoral space as any other entity. They are a key player because they are perceived as having fewer constituent-specific claims to make. Samdhana understands that the large scale mapping work will require more active participation from *kabupaten* and provincial supporters, so that is a key consideration going forward. There may be opportunities for CLUA to play an important leverage role, as it has done to date in Papua, in connecting provincial processes to *kabupaten*-level licensing decisions.

Larger-scale mapping – This evaluation took in two of the major mapping efforts supported by Samdhana, in Riau (Talang Mamak) and West Kalimantan (Kapuas Hulu). These are very promising efforts, and yet at this time there is still no airtight guarantee that the effort will translate into a durable political win beyond the conclusion of SBY's term in political office, since land registration continues to rely on the 'good graces' of agencies whose political orientation may be upended this year. Samdhana has thought seriously about the large-scale mapping question and developed a template that includes support and overall buy-in from the *pemerintah daerah.* **Recommendation: CLUA should dialogue with Samdhana,** *pemerintah daerah,* **and other donors (NORAD, NCFI, MAC Foundation, Ecosystem Partnership Fund, etc.) around these larger-scale opportunities for gazetting *adat* lands,** if possible creating a matrix of highest-priority efforts for the next 24 months**.** Samdhana estimates the ability to map areas of 400,000 ha within 6-12 months for $20,000 per effort, based on work of the SLPP teams that have already been built. The key factors necessary to succeed at Samdhana's proposed timetable and burn rate, however, are non-trivial:

- **Significant social preparation ahead of time** usually provided by AMAN staff **and technical preparation** via JKPP's mobilization of a local cartography team;
- **Sympathetic local government personnel;** and
- **Good base maps** based on the history of community mapping efforts in this area, and JKPP / Sekala recent engagement.

There is probably no need for CLUA to express a preference for one or another tenure instrument shown in the earlier text box. These will be worked out on a case-by-case basis, so mostly it is important that CLUA keep abreast of the national administrative environment for these respective systems, *and* to capture 'lessons learned' from any successful use of one instrument or another. Key CLUA partners in this work will be Samdhana, Kemitraan, the REDD+ Agency, and Papua Province's Low-carbon development strategy team.

Scaling up/down 'Small Grants'? One of the specific tasks of this Evaluation was to ask where CLUA stood in relation to a 'development trajectory' of small grant support. Was the re-granting strategy working? Are there many more productive small grants that could be made on a volume basis? Or was it better to continue nurturing a particular set of relationships, with consistent partners, using a highly targeted set of political strategies?

To summarize the role of small grants at this stage: they support *activities* pertaining usually to mapping or *huta desa* designation goals; they connect to *medium sized grant* purveyors of technical assistance, and in many cases they connect to AMAN as an advocacy partner. In the aggregate, they are extremely important for CLUA's longer-term support for the particular political outcomes found in Appendix B; but they do not provide the basis for growing or even sustaining organizations.

Appendix C attempts to situate CLUA support to Samdhana with respect to the small grants program and the capacity building supports associated with it. Appendix C contrasts a general 'fund the field' approach at one extreme with another extreme implying that CLUA will only support re-granting in particular geographies for pursuing specific political outcomes. Appendix C also notes the different strategies that are associated with different size grants.

There was *much* higher demand for a tiered system of REDD+ related public education and small grants in 2009-2011, when there was a huge need for basic information on REDD+ programs and mechanisms. The focus was on capacity building and quick response – and can be deemed a success. Samdhana soon found that *pemerintah daerah* often had no more information than CSOs about what was expected from national REDD+ programs—and thus due to CLUA/NORAD support to Samdhana, civil society was not 'left behind' in the national REDD+ conversation, and to drive that conversation in some significant instances (Central Kalimantan). The 2012 proposal evinced greater focus on drivers of deforestation and proposed engagement with private sector actors; and, for 2014, political decisions taken over the last year will have much more significance for structuring Samdhana's overall workplan.

In sum, there are good reasons in the short term for CLUA to move more toward the 'targeted political outcomes' end of the table in Appendix C. But even so, CLUA should allow Samdhana a significant measure of flexibility: as one example, AMAN, JKPP and Samdhana all acknowledge that the scale at which they can respond to the new Village Forest (*Hutan Desa*) instrument is not commensurate with the opportunity (or threat). Here the connections between 'medium-sized' grants and the small grants program is vital, and CLUA should be very comfortable with how this is formulated. More support for work on this instrument at this time would be welcome. Similarly, I assume that Samdhana would also like to scale up work on licensing and direct engagement with *perusahaan* that was indicated in previous reporting—although I am less clear on how many good opportunities Samdhana and its partners are finding for doing so, and what international and dispute-resolution partners are most useful to these opportunities. There isn't yet the same kind of 'medium-sized' grant anchor in the Samdhana portfolio for work with *perusahaan,* but this may not matter insofar as CLUA elsewhere supports Greenpeace, RAN, FPP, Scale-Up, and others in addressing its Strategy 3. Samdhana also continues to be able to draw from its legal-mechanism-oriented partners HuMa and Epistema, who are active on *perusahan* and *izin* questions as well.

But to address the specific question of whether there an 'unlimited number of small grant opportunities' out there—an abundance of upstart NGOs running on volunteer energy of youth, hoping to obtain core or project funding in order to take their work to the next level—the answer is no, this is not supported by discussions and examination of field realities. Several respondents, in fact, referred to a "crisis of

kaderisasi": on-going difficulties recruiting qualified personnel to work in the struggle for land rights. Expanding urban work opportunities, particularly for those coming out of law faculties, has thinned the ranks of young lawyers in the 'movement'.   Samdhana may have ended up making more repeat grants, thus lowering their 'graduation' rate of organizations, due to the lack of better alternatives.   And, of course, Samdhana's strategic positioning between 'movement builder' and 'public administration function' is not an either/or question, but it is one that directly impacts their workplan, and merits further discussion with CLUA.

Many respondents were anxious about the development of second tiers of organizational leadership.   In some cases, Samdhana has addressed this by bringing those younger leaders to Bogor for training. Different respondents reported very different levels of attention to this issue from Mentors in the different regions. Of course, development of internal leadership capacity is not Samdhana's responsibility – indeed, regional NGOs show good will toward Samdhana in part because they are perceived as 'hands off' with respect to the internal management structures of their partners—but the point should be raised as to whether Samdhana might wish to target this issue more specifically. It has supported 'young leader training' for indigenous activist youth – but generally this is seen as enabling them to play a stronger facilitative role in their communities, rather than as a means toward addressing the *kaderisasi* issues that will need to be addressed to sustain Indonesian civil society capacity. Appendix D tries to address this point.

Building a composite picture of feedback from Samdhana fellows, I suggest that there will be three major sources for *kaderisasi* in the near future: paralegal trainers (conflict resolution mediation/ facilitation capacity currently the skill in shortest supply); *via* AMAN field staff and youth leadership development efforts, including mapping verification work groups, and 'pro-environment' *adat* youth wings; and finally, the Simpul Pelayanan Pemetaan Partisipatif (SMPP) voluntary cartography teams. Ironically, the crisis of *kaderisasi* has *not* generally been due to young activists choosing political parties as their vehicle for activism. Indonesia's political parties are primarily patronage networks; they haven't become vehicles for the professionalization of public administration; but the situation bears watching, to see if such a political vehicle is on the horizon, or could be built with parts available today.

CONCLUSION

The current structure of CLUA support to Samdhana—combining small grants and medium-sized grants, mentoring support and 'start-up' program funds for regional NGOs—is sound.   There is room for the program to expand in overall dollar-invested terms.   Any new increment of support should probably be targeted at the set of specific political opportunities that will play out in 2014-2015 pertaining to *hutan desa* and *adat* rights. At the same time, Samdhana should retain its flexibility to make creative 'fund the field' choices to support continued civil society base-building.

CLUA's grants to Samdhana are greatly enhanced by good complementarity with Norway's programs and those of other donors, so CLUA should be invited to see their particular outcomes in light of these other

sources of support—Samdhana's small grant and technical assistance programs are much more than the sum of its parts.

Finally, a key feature of Samdhana's overall package of assistance is also the least scalable—and that is the time and attention of the Fellows. The Fellows (Mentors') role is essential, and CLUA (and other Samdhana donors) should not become so enthusiastic about the institute's re-granting function that it outstrips the capacity of Fellows and Samdhana senior staff to keep up with their numerous field partners. Managing these critical relationships, and working on specified political opportunities, taken together is Samdhana's greatest value-add in its program engagement with CLUA.

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[i] Naturally, this announcement resulted in the articulation of a variety of 'low carbon development' planning frameworks, including Bappenas' GHG Emission Reduction Action Plan; the Ministry of Forestry's REDD Strategy; the REDD+ Task Force National Strategy; DNPI's Local Carbon Development Strategy; and at the subnational level, the Aceh Green and Papua Low Carbon Development plans.

[ii] In fact the grant, based on a proposal submitted by Samdhana on 20 Dec 12, doubled the size of the 'ask'. The $750,000 subsequently granted—out of a total project budget of $1.5M – constituted the single largest award in the CLUA-Indonesia portfolio. The other $750,000 came from NORAD, and was granted for similar purposes as in the CLUA grant. Samdhana during this time also received support from a foundation aligned with CLUA, the Margaret A. Cargill Foundation, for integrated conservation and development work in Papua Province.

[iii] These four grants went to AMAN (indigenous rights), JKPP (community mapping), Forest Watch Indonesia (data aggregation in GIS systems), and Sorong (Papua).

[iv] Another important factor in Indonesian civil society's denunciation of REDD+ was that this oppositional space was 'claimed' by the Indonesian affiliate of the international Friends of the Earth (FOE) network, WALHI. FOE at that time was in the process of deciding for itself that all international carbon offsetting schemes were a bad idea and thus needed to be opposed, and FOE provided much of raw material for WALHI's negatively-framed leadership in this space.

[v] Significant also is the National Parliament (DPR)'s weakening of the KPK's powers as this report is being finalized. See http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Yudhoyono-under-fire-for-reducing-powers-of-Anti-Corruption-Commission-30452.html. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is suspected by civil society of also wanting to reduce the powers of the anti-Corruption Commission, primarily to protect his family.

vi   A couple of respondents however did say they wished Samdhana was more deliberate in their use of and support for different network models – to be clearer when and where it was most appropriate for Samdhana to pursue (and support) 'hub and spoke' models that kept the institute in a political decision-making role, and where Samdhana should just have been supporting true peer-to-peer networking, without attempting to guide outcomes.

vii   Samdhana staff used the term 'Advisors' in interviews—people whose expertise they rely on, but who aren't staff or fellows. Nonette Royo by contrast provided a breakout that classified key leaders in JKPP and AMAN as 'Consultants'. Advisors are seen as a) partners in developing national strategy; b) representatives of organizations that benefit from the field activities of Samdhana small grant partners; and/or c) peers in a broader movement context. Examples of these include leaders at HuMa, Epistema, Telapak, and other national NGOs. Outputs from interviews with these Advisors are under-represented in this report, but they provided extremely valuable context-setting information to the Evaluator.

viii   Others involved included representatives from Telapak, Flora and Fauna International, Forest Peoples Programme, plus partners in Papua.

ix   Evaluator had expected to go to Jambi Province, since Jambi is a priority province for CLUA and also stated as such by Samdhana. However, there is no longer the same degree of small grant activity in the province as before – based in no small measure on the earlier grants that helped to build NGO capacity there. Jambi should thus be seen as a success story, and the Evaluator appreciated Samdhana's willingness to steer him toward more complicated provincial contexts (Riau, West Kalimantan, Papua) where Samdhana staff thought they'd learn more from the evaluation.

x   Some of this problem was mitigated by the use of Mac Chapin's approach to large-scale mapping, which is to put everything on the map before trying to draw boundaries around it – so that common agreement on the placement of symbols and physical attributes of the land are put up front and trust is built thereby – but nonetheless, boundary issues became very difficult in both the West Kalimantan and Papua situations, and have slowed mapping processes considerably there.

xi   AMAN concluded an MOU with the National Land Administration Agency (BPN), but unfortunately there was a change in leadership at BPN, and the new director there is not nearly as interested in working with AMAN as the director with whom AMAN concluded the MOU. AMAN offered more wishful thinking than concrete strategy regarding what might happen next with this relationship.

        Samdhana also made a grant to the NGO Indonesian Forest Watch (FWI), primarily mapping not *adat* lands, like AMAN, but rather forest cover. FWI seemed a less vital partner than AMAN, however. Both the CLUA mapping partner Sekala, as well as Forest Watch Indonesia, should be encouraged to share data and to play a greater downstream role, analytically. GIS systems are multi-layered, and communities should benefit from the juxtaposition of layers, usually showing high correlations between forest cover/carbon stock and patterns of ongoing community ownership and control. Samdhana expressed some frustration in terms of civil society mapping coordination and data sharing, and deemed better coordination a highly strategic outcome, since showing correlation between secure tenure and high carbon stocks is not necessarily something that the Ministry of Forestry is keen to allow demonstrated.

xii   Samdhana required co-funding from local governments for all large-scale mapping efforts this year, so as to increase buy-in of the process and better delineate the lines between government and civil society mapping roles.

xiii   Of course, this may be an advantage or disadvantage, depending on relations between governor and *Bupati,* between local government units, as well as the region's visibility in national debates on plantation licensing (in the Sumatra, *Talang Mamak* case) and national park management/conservation efforts (relevant to the *Kapuas Hulu* effort in Kalimantan).

xiv   JKPP badly underestimated levels of inter-community conflict in Kapuas Hulu and as a result badly under-budgeted for work. Both the Ford Foundation and Samdhana have provided additional grant support to keep the process moving. The large-scale mapping work is critical to Samdhana, AMAN, and JKPP political strategy, but none of these large-scale mapping exercises can yet be put in the 'win' column.

xv   The case was brought by Riau and KalBar-based groups supported by AMAN.

xvi   Undang-Undang #21 (2001), Otonomi Khusus Papua. Five important *Peraturan Daerah* (local administrative measures) have been promulgated, giving local authorities in Papua what they need to issue guidelines for land use. The Ministry of Forestry has contested that authority by stating that the 1999 Forest Law

takes precedent because it deals with *kawasan hutan.* This legal conflict between Papua's Special Autonomy, and the overarching nature of the Forest Law, has not been adjudicated as of now.

xvii   "bersifat top-down, exo-pembangunan dengan bias perdagangan carbon tanpa memberikan perlawanan berarti dalam pemikiran dan pelaksanaan di lapangan."   The strategy also contrasts 'REDD readiness' with 'REDD preparedness', with the former referring to the top-down, country-led approach that characterizes REDD discussions in UNFCCC and World Bank spaces, and the latter referring to CSO efforts to work with communities to develop local initiatives and modify REDD in ways that work for people.

xviii   Samdhana strategy for Papua references 'berdaulat' – sovereignty of use-rights – while also in preambular language recognizes mutuality: "ownership by communities is acknowledged by the State, while the roles of the state are also acknowledged by communities".   This statement is of deep political importance in the Papua context. The need to assert this fact probably wouldn't have occurred to partners in Kalimantan and Sumatra.

xix   See for example the important editorial published 19 February 2014, ***Restitusi Hak Wilayah Adat,*** by Samdhana Fellow Noer Fauzi Rachman, at http://print.kompas.com/2014/02/19/Restitusi-Hak-Wilayah-Adat.

xx   The specific strategies and budget expenses associated with each in that January 2014 reporting include:

39.%   Project Objective 1 – "land use change planning and licensing arrangements" (incl *tatu ruang* + mapping)
25.7%   Project Object. 2 – "engage effectively with forestry and plantation license holders re: community lands"
21.8%   Project Object. 3 – "communities secure rights to manage their landscapes"
13%   Overhead

xxi   See also http://www.iwgia.org/news/search-news?news_id=900 for information about JKPP's role in publishing the 'Indicative Map' of Indonesian indigenous territories.

xxii   Additionally, AMAN is solving the 'subject/object' distinction in development in better ways than other elements of the agrarian reform movement, by developing legal strategies, helping indigenous candidates for political office, registering territories in the BRWA system and publishing (with JKPP) an 'indicative map' of indigenous areas. While Javanese farmers have found some ways to express their political demands, in general this work is still intermediated by CSOs; and of course the environmental groups are purely an NGO phenomenon, something different from either 'people's organization' or indigenous-rights-holder perspectives.

xxiii   The clearest example of this is with respect to AMAN's tactical intransigence with respect to *hutan desa* as opposed to *hutan adat.* Hutan desa is a recognized form of territorial administration, with stated acreage targets to be achieved by such-and-such date. *Hutan adat*, by contrast, exists as the strategy of a social movement – one supported by a serious body of legal analysis and intensive mapping efforts, which may result in the recognition of territory. AMAN's case is strengthened by Indonesia's adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (although it simultaneously argues in international fora that the concept doesn't apply to Indonesia's demographic and national situation), as well as to the international norm of Free Prior and Informed Consent—but it is not a sure thing that this political strategy will ultimately work. The MK35 decision was a hugely positive development for AMAN, however.

xxiv   Appendix B was 'field-tested' first with a set of JKPP partners, and then in a broader meeting with partners in Kalimantan. I am grateful for their input and contribution to the refining of this matrix.

CLUA Management Response to the Samdhana Evaluation
Conducted by Independent Evaluator, Peter Riggs

26 March 2014

Samdhana has been an important partner for CLUA since 2009, particularly in empowering communities and Indonesian NGOs so they would actively take part in planning and exercising land use management, in the light of REDD+ readiness and later the Constitutional Court ruling of 35. CLUA itself completed its strategic plan for the Indonesia Initiative in 2012. It is in the benefit for CLUA and Samdhana to review how strategic and effective the collaboration of Samdhana and CLUA have been, as well as how the alignment of Samdhana program to the new CLUA Indonesia Initiative strategy would be further improved.

CLUA thanks Peter Riggs who has successfully conducted the evaluation on Samdhana's program of work and provided useful recommendations to improve CLUA initiative in Indonesia viz a viz with Samdhana's future program. CLUA welcomes the findings, and provides the following responses to the evaluation report.

1. Samdhana's program for the institutional development of the grantees is important so the grantees are more capable in developing proposal, effectively implementing and reporting the project. CLUA shares the view of the Evaluator that Samdhana's "total package" approach to re-granting and the Samdhana Fellows have been instrumental to this end. In the future the Fellows could play an even stronger role in facilitating the grantees if they could be locally based, so they are more available to work with Samdhana grantees. CLUA is keen to explore further how the fellow approach could benefit more the grantees.

2. CLUA recognizes the quick and flexible ability of the Fellows in making best use of new arising opportunities, in both national or local policy setting. As part of this, CLUA recognizes the importance of line-item budget support for regional planning meetings, and tactical meeting money enabling fast responses to the rapidly changing set of new tenure opportunities. CLUA is keen to work closer with Samdhana staff and Fellows to coordinate strategy and tactics in taking advantage of advocacy opportunities related to important policy developments. CLUA and Samdhana will discuss the parameters of coordination. An important part of this discussion will be how to engender better collaboration between field NGOs and national NGOs.

3. A strength of the civil society movement in both coordinating actions or information sharing is building responsive and complementary networking. CLUA is therefore keen to explore further with Samdhana how more effective communication networking among the grantees can be pursued.

4. CLUA recognizes the Evaluator's assessment that Samdhana's investment on JKPP and AMAN is the best hope for successful 'bottom-up' use of new pathways created in 2013 toward recognizing land rights. CLUA also directly support JKPP and AMAN, and will discuss with Samdhana how to coordinate more effectively to ensure synergistic results in terms of forest mapping and recognition by JKPP and AMAN, as well as incorporating conflict resolution, which

24

JKPP and AMAN need help with. An important part of this discussion will be when and where large-scale participatory mapping is the most appropriate.

5. CLUA is developing communication strategy in 2014, which will mostly support partners and grantees to undertake strategic communication in pursuing specific targets. CLUA will make use of the communication experts to also support Samdhana and its grantees' communication planning. We see clearly the complementary role that strategic communications can play with Samdhana. Thus, Intermatrix and our CLUA Communication Advisers can work closely with Samdhana in the future

6. As recommended by the evaluator, CLUA will suggest to Samdhana to develop an evaluation system for future small grants and retire the "graduation system." We will also discuss with Samdhana how to operationalize the evaluators recommendation for a "matrix for expressing skills transfer and civil society development goals in relation to regranting strategy."

7. CLUA will recommend to Samdhana to pursue better empirical documentation that land rights help secure and enhance forest carbon stocks *at broader landscape levels* via current mapping efforts. We will also recommend to Samdhana to help communities take advantage of new income opportunities to make the case for a better and broader rural development paradigm.

8. CLUA recognizes and appreciates the evolution of the Samdhana regranting program from a broadly-focused capacity building effort to one which is more focused strategically. We encourage Samdhana's next proposal to reflect that evolution and frame the scope of the regranting effort along well-defined strategic lines of work.